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TAKING FREE SPEECH SERIOUSLY: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
ARNOLD H. LOEWY *
Although always believing that the United States Supreme
Court should invalidate the portion of the Child Pornography
Protection Act (CPPA)' that proscribes the dissemination of any
image "that appears to be... a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct," 2 I seriously doubted that it would do so. For one thing,
the Court granted certiorari in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,3 a
case in which the Ninth Circuit had invalidated the statute. Having
previously denied certiorari in a case in which the lower courts had
upheld the statute,4 there was good reason to believe that the Court
intended to reverse the Ninth Circuit. Fortunately, that did not
happen.
Apart from the procedural posture of the case, a cursory
glance at the equities appears to favor the statute. The value of
exploiting the sexuality of children certainly appears to be de
minimus. 5 Furthermore, the government made at least a surface
case that virtual child pornography can be harmful to children.6
With that kind of a balance, one might have anticipated a
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill School of Law. The author wishes to thank his Research Assistant,
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1. Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121(2)(8)(c), 110 Stat. 3009-26, 3009-28 (1996).
2. See Arnold H. Loewy, Obsceniy, Pornography, and First Amendment
Theory, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 471,480-82 (1993).
3. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
4. Hilton v. United States, 528 U.S. 844 (1999), denying cert. to United
States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
5. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982) ("The value of
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.").
6. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d at 1098 (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (referring to evidence presented in CPPA hearings suggesting that
"virtual child pornography causes real harm to real children").
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willingness to accept the invitation of Judge Ferguson of the Ninth
Circuit to create a new category of unprotected speech called
"virtual child pornography." 7 Though undoubtedly tempted, the
Court rejected going down that wrong road.
In this paper, I will focus on both the importance and
correctness of the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition.
8
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING BAD SPEECH
Few liberal democracies challenge freedom of speech in the
abstract. Specific applications, however, are different. Many who
would never challenge freedom of speech in the abstract balk at
extending such protection to flag burners9 and Nazis.' 0  Yet the
slightest reflection should reveal that unless all speech is free, no
speech is free. No sensible government, including the most
dictatorial, will ever prosecute good speech or even neutral
7. Id. at 1100 (dissenting opinion).
8. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
9. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-35 (1989) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that flag burning should be categorically excluded from
First Amendment protection); id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the criminalization of flag burning constitutes a trivial burden on freedom of
speech). Following Johnson, Congress and the President again attempted to ban
flag burning with the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which the Supreme Court
again overturned by a bare five to four majority in United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1217 (Sprecher, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that a Nazi march in predominantly Jewish Skokie,
Illinois, "may be so extremely offensive and of such little social utility as to be
beyond the protection of the First Amendment"). In a recent European case with
strong ramifications in the United States, the Tribunal de Grande Instance (High
Court) of Paris held that the act of displaying Nazi memorabilia for sale violated
section R645-1 of the French criminal code and that the American website
Yahoo! must comply with French law and deny access of French internet users
via www.yahoo.com to any "Nazi artifact auction service." T.G.I. Paris, May
22, 2000, Interim Court Order No. 00/050308, 00/05309, cited and translated in
part in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1184-85 (N.D. Cal. 2001). See also, David Kretzmer, Free Speech and Racism,
8 CARDOZO L. REv. 445 (1987) (offering several justifications for restrictions on
racist speech).
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speech." Indeed, no democracy would even think of prosecuting
ordinarily bad speech (e.g. "Vote Republican").12 It is only when
we get to very bad speech that the government even thinks about
prosecution. Thus, it is in those situations in which free speech is
needed most. Hence, protection for Nazis, flag burners, and virtual
child pornographers logically follows if we want to take free
speech seriously.
But should we want to take it seriously if the cost of doing
so is to give added protection for speech that we would all be
better off without? One's first intuition is to say "no," and indeed,
that is the result regularly reached in European courts' 3 and too
frequently reached in American courts.' 4  The reason that this
should bother us is that it gives government the power to decide
which speech can compete in the marketplace and which speech is
dead on arrival.
11. See Arnold H. Loewy, Criminal Speech: Should Free Trade in Ideas
be Absolute?, 2 CRIM. L.F. 117, 117-18 (1990).
12. Or if you don't like that one, try "Vote Democrat."
13. In Gay News, Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1982),
the European Commission of Human Rights upheld a conviction for blasphemy,
reasoning that a law prohibiting speech that offends religious sensibilities is
justifiable as a limitation on free expression "for the protection of... the rights
of others" under the meaning of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Cf Jones v. Toben (F.C.A. 2002)
(ordering an Australian website to remove content suggesting that the Nazi
holocaust was a hoax on the grounds that such content violated Australia's
Racial Discrimination Act of 1975),
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federalct/2002/1150.html (Sept. 17,
2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
14. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a
California anti-obscenity statute); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-35
(1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that flag burning should be
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection). As I have said
elsewhere, "[i]t is understandable that our President, Congress, legislators, and
general populace who do not regularly study the First Amendment would
initially condemn the Johnson decision. It is more difficult to rationalize the
opinions of the Supreme Court dissenters who really ought to know better."
Arnold H. Loewy, The Flag-Burning Case: Freedom of Speech When We Need
It Most, 68 N.C. L. REV. 165, 172-73 (1989); cf. Loewy, supra note 2 (arguing
that American obscenity law is overly restrictive in light of sound First
Amendment theory).
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While some of us might be happy to relegate flag burning,
Nazi marches, and virtual pornography to the scrapheap of dead-
on-arrival speech, few would say that about speech urging racial
integration. Yet speech urging racial integration fifty years ago
would have been thought highly offensive to much of the citizenry
of a large number of American communities and would have been
subject to prohibition under a standard that protects the dignitary
interest of some against the speech of others. Thus, even though
government may be correct about some types of speech, it is better
to deny government the power to suppress that speech than to grant
it the power to suppress speech that may turn out to be valuable
(such as civil rights speech).
15
The fact that virtual pornography appears to be
entertainment rather than ideological indoctrination is immaterial.
In one of its most prescient moments, the Supreme Court of the
United States observed:
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that
the constitutional protection for a free press
applies only to the exposition of ideas. The
line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
that basic right. Everyone is familiar with
instances of propaganda throhgh fiction.
What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine.' 6
It is true that the United States Supreme Court exempts obscenity
from its otherwise relatively libertarian view of free speech, but as
I have demonstrated elsewhere, this is more the result of fiat than
logic. 17 And, somewhat paradoxically, the concept of obscenity as
unprotected speech is not the law in many European countries.'
8
15. For a more detailed development of this point, see Arnold H. Loewy,
Freedom of Speech as a Product of Democracy, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 427
(1993).
16. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
17. See Loewy, supra note 2.
18. See John Quigley, Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43
FLA. L. REV. 347 (1991). Quigley notes that many European nations permit
most speech American law would define as "obscenity" and that "[w]hile some
European penal codes do prohibit possession of child pornography for
[Vol. I
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In any event, the presence of the obscenity doctrine militates
against, rather than for, a separate unprotected category of virtual
child pornography. Given the American law of obscenity, which
allows obscene materials to be prosecuted, 19 the need for a special
law condemning virtual child pornography is substantially reduced.
Most really offensive virtual child pornography would likely be
subject to prosecution as obscenity anyway,2 ° while a virtual
sexually explicit presentation of Romeo and Juliet would not.
II. DISTINGUISHING REAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Real child pornography is rightly subject to prosecution.
But the reason that it is so treated has nothing to do with the
abhorrent nature or intrinsic worthlessness of the material. It can
be prosecuted for the same reason that employment of child labor
can be prosecuted. Just as child labor harms the children that
manufacture the goods to be sold, so does child pornography. It
would not be a defense to a child labor prosecution that
employment of children was necessary to enhance the quantity or
quality of the product produced. Similarly, it should be no defense
distribution, they do not prohibit the possession of such materials for personal
use in the home or elsewhere." Id. at 402 (citing the Penal Codes of England,
Italy, France, Hungary, and the former U.S.S.R.). Similarly, in Germany the
focus is on protecting children, not banning pornography: German federal law
"allows the distribution of adult communications if generally available
technology allows parents to prevent their children from accessing such
contents." Lothar Determann, The New German Internet Law, 22 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 113, 146 (1998). Denmark goes even further, having
repealed its obscenity statute in 1969. Eric Schlosser, The Business of
Pornography, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 10, 1997, at 42, 50.
19. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (holding that material that predominantly
appeals to the prurient interest, describes sex in a patently offensive way, and
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value, is outside the ambit
of First Amendment protection).
20. It certainly seems to appeal predominantly to a prurient (shameful or
morbid) interest in sex, describe sex in a patently offensive way, and lack
serious literary, artistic, or scientific value. To be sure, the Ferber jury found
the defendant guilty of disseminating child pornography and not guilty of
disseminating obscenity with respect to the same movies. New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 752 (1982). Most probably, this was due to an unwillingness to
convict twice for what was essentially one offense.
2003]
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that the finished product had some kind of literary or artistic merit.
It is the use of a child in an explicit sexual performance that is
rightly forbidden.
2'
Similarly, as the United States Supreme Court has
suggested, morphed child pornography 22 is enough like real child
pornography that it should be treated as though it were real.23 A
morphed image does not harm a real child in the making of the
picture, but it does harm the child by providing an unauthorized
permanent and false record of the child's engaging in sexual
activity.
24
Apart from pornography that displays the image of a real
child, actual or morphed, the objections to these materials are
similar to the objections to any kind of distasteful speech, and
should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny. In the remainder of
this paper, I shall explain why none of the' justifications generally
advanced against virtual child pornography warrant its prohibition.
III. VIRTUAL PORNOGRAPHY'S CAPACITY TO HARM REAL
CHILDREN
Proponents of criminalizing virtual pornography argue that
there are two ways in which such materials can harm real children.
First, they argue that virtual child pornography can whet a
pedophile's appetite, making it more likely that he will abuse real
21. 1 put to one side the issue of whether the jurisdiction punishing the
dissemination of child pornography is the one in which the pornography was
made. 1 deal with the resolution of that issue elsewhere. See Loewy, supra note
2, at 480-82.
22. "Morphed" child pornography consists of images of a real child
altered, often by computer, so that the child appears to be engaging in sexual
activity. See Aschroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1397 (2002).
23. The suggestion stopped short of a holding. In Free Speech Coalition,
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[a]lthough morphed images may fall within the
definition of virtual child pornography, they implicate the interests of real
children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber." Id.
24. Certainly such pictures can cause harm by their very existence.
Consider the recent Miss North Carolina dispute in the 2002 Miss America
contest. Miss North Carolina's photograph was taken unauthorizedly while she
was changing clothes. The mere suggestion that such a picture existed was
enough to cause her to resign from the Miss America pageant.
[Vol. I
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children. 25 Second, they argue that a pedophile can use a picture of
what appears to be a real child enjoying her sexuality as a visual
aid to persuade an innocent victim to engage in similar activity. I
will treat these arguments separately.
As to the first argument, I question both its factual accuracy
and its legal significance. As to its accuracy, I assume that many,
if not most, pedophiles possess child pornography. But it is quite
another thing to assume that the pornography caused the
pedophilia. More likely, it was the perpetrator's attraction to
children that caused him to possess the pornography, rather than
vice-versa. 7 Indeed, one does not have to approach a "Clockwork
Orange '' 28 scenario to find behavioralists employing child
pornography for the purpose of curing pedophiles.
2 9
25. E.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121(4), 110 Stat. 3009-26, 3009-26 (1996) (finding that "child pornography is
often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their
own sexual appetites").
26. E.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121(1)(c) (finding that
"child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children
into sexual activity with an adult").
27. See EBERHARD KRONHAUSEN & PHYLLIS KRONHAUSEN,
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 335 (Ballantine Books 1964) (1959) (arguing that
"it is clinically very dangerous to block by critical or prohibitory attitudes and
actions the few remaining fantasy outlets of sexually disturbed individuals"); see
also 2 MARCIA PALLY, SENSE AND CENSORSHIP: THE VANITY OF THE BONFIRES
42-43 (1991) (reprinting studies conducted in Denmark, Sweden, and the former
West Germany that conclude that the availability of sexually explicit material
leads to less crime, not more). Even opponents of pornography have long had to
concede that there is "no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual
materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquency or criminal
behavior among youth or adults." U.S. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 32 (1970). For a similar concession, see Lydia W. Lee, Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996: Confronting the Challenges of Virtual
Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 639 (1999).
28. A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (Warner Brothers 1971). In this film, a
criminal is repeatedly shown images of horrific violence and given a drug that
makes him associate those images with strong feelings of nausea. The character
is released into the world unable to commit any violent acts or even to think
violent thoughts.
29. See W.C. Lobitz & J. LoPiccolo, New Methods in Behavioral
Treatment of Sexual Dysfunction, 3 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL
2003]
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I do not mean to argue that there has never been a
pedophile who but for the pornography would not have committed
his crime. But that can hardly be the relevant standard. To sustain
this justification, it would be necessary to establish that virtual
child pornography (as opposed to real child pornography) has
significantly increased pedophilia. To prove that five people who
viewed virtual pornography committed an act of pedophilia that
they otherwise would not have committed (assuming one could
establish causation, which I doubt) would only tell half of the
story. We would also have to know how many potential
pedophiles had their appetites satiated by virtual child
pornography, and therefore left real children alone.
To illustrate, three of the most heinous crimes in history
were inspired respectively by the Holy Bible,30 an Anglican High
Church service,3  and the movie The Ten Commandments.
Obviously, nobody measures the worth of these sources by the
worst things that they inspired. To be sure, child pornography,
virtual or otherwise, has undoubtedly done far more harm and far
less good than the aforementioned sources. Nevertheless, it is not
intuitively obvious, nor has it been proven, that eliminating all
virtual pornography from the face of the earth would significantly
reduce the incidence of pedophilia.
More importantly, even if it could be proven that virtual
child pornography caused significant net harm, it would not follow
that the law should permit its suppression. One of the costs of free
speech is the recognition that sometimes speech will do more harm
than good. Even so, for the reasons already given,33 it is better to
PSYCHIATRY 245, 265-71 (1972); Patricia Gillan, Therapeutic Uses of
Obscenity, in CENSORSHIP AND OBSCENITY 127 (Rajeev Dhavan & Christie
Davies eds., 1978).
30. Albert Fish was inspired to castrate and "sacrifice" young boys by
reading about sacrifices in the Bible. Earl Finbar Murphy, The Value of
Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655, 668 (1964).
31. John George Haigh was inspired by the procedures of the Anglican
High Church Service to drink his victims' blood through straws and dissolve
their bodies in acid baths. Id.
32. Heinrich Pommerenke was prompted by Cecil B. DeMille's film The
Ten Commandments to rape, abuse, and slay women. Id.
33. See supra Section 1.
[Vol. I
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allow the speech to cause whatever harm it may rather than to
allow the government the power to decide whether the material can
be published at all. For example, The Turner Diaries was said to
have been the inspiration for Timothy McVeigh's massacre at
Oklahoma City. It would not be hard for a court to conclude that
on a cost-benefit basis that book should be condemned. Indeed, it
is hard for me to believe that The Turner Diaries did not do
significantly more harm than good. Yet, I would vehemently
oppose the government's power to remove it from the marketplace
of ideas.
To further illustrate the wrongness of allowing judges (or
legislators) to condemn a book based on its net harm, imagine a
claim in the United States that the Qur'an should be banned
because it was said to inspire the 9/11 terrorists. Would anybody
feel comfortable leaving a good versus harm standard to American
judges, most of whom are Christian, in regard to Islam's holiest
book? I certainly would not, and thus conclude that even if virtual
child pornography were conclusively shown to do more harm than
good, the Supreme Court was correct in not allowing it to be
eliminated.34
As to the argument that virtual pornography can be used to
seduce children, Justice Kennedy, for the Supreme Court, got it
exactly right when he noted that if virtual pornography is to be
suppressed because of its capacity to seduce children, we might as
well suppress "cartoons, video games, and candy. 35 (He could
have added bicycles, puppy dogs, and vans.) The point is, of
course, that many things, including but not limited to literature, can
be misused. But, as the Court once succinctly put it, we must not
"reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for
children."
36
34. To further illustrate this point, consider the Hollywood satire
Pleasantville (New Line Cinema 1998), which recounts the story of a town from
the 1950s where only sweetness and light is allowed. Anybody who dares to
deviate from the approved "everything is perfect" mantra is dealt with harshly.
35. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1402 (2002).
36. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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IV. DISTINGUISHING VIRTUAL FROM REAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
By far the most powerful argument for punishing virtual
child pornography is the difficulty of distinguishing it from the real
thing. The argument is that virtual and real pictures look so
indistinguishable that a person marketing real child pornography
might argue either that the material is virtual (and you cannot
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not) or at least that the
defendant believed that it was virtual. To the extent that this
argument rests on a factually sound premise, it presents a very
serious problem. If real child pornography is punishable, but
virtual is not, and you cannot tell the difference, what's a
government to do?
The good news is that, at least for now, that does not seem
to be an insurmountable problem. Although criminal defendants
charged with possession of child pornography have sometimes
argued that the material was virtual, they have not generally
succeeded.37 Furthermore, there is technology available that
allows the government to take a picture apart, pixel by pixel, to
determine its origin. 38 Thus, at present, detection appears to be
keeping up with technology.
To the extent that technology outstrips detection and one
really cannot tell the difference, some type of burden of proof
shifting device might be appropriate. Surely, the government
should be able to argue that a picture that appears real can be
treated as real in the absence of evidence that it is not. Such a rule
would differ from the one at issue in Free Speech Coalition, where
37. Indeed, as of April 16, 2002, when Free Speech Coalition was
decided, they had never succeeded. See Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at
1406 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. The technique is called "digital pixel examination." See Jim Goldman,
Detecting Real Child Porn: New Software Tools Spot Doctored Pictures (April
22, 2002) (reporting that this closely guarded technology "may be helping police
spot pornographic pictures that depict actual children"), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/TechTV/techtv-childpom020-422.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2003) (on file with First Amendment Law Review).
[Vol. I
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the statute allowed punishment even when it was clear that the
picture was virtual.39
As for the scienter issue, presumably it would take more
than the defendant's word that he intended to transmit virtual
pictures to create a reasonable doubt. If the Government proves
that the pictures are real, a simple statement from the defendant
that he thought they were virtual would be very unlikely to create a
reasonable doubt.
V. DECRIMINALIZING VIRTUAL PORNOGRAPHY MAY PROTECT
REAL CHILDREN
It is certainly not immediately obvious that real children
would be better off by allowing the sale of virtual pornography, yet
that may in fact be the case. In an ideal world, nobody would want
child pornography, real or virtual. Unfortunately, the world we
live in is not ideal. Despite the efforts of all civilized governments
to suppress child pornography, it is still with us. Why? Simply
because the demand is there. If one accepts the unfortunate truth
that the demand for child pornography exists despite these
governmental efforts, there is little reason to believe that we will
totally stamp it out.
On the other hand, if virtual child pornography is (or can be
made) nearly identical to real child pornography and only the latter
is unlawful, why wouldn't the pornographer sell only the former?
Certainly most pornographers would love to avoid the risk of
prison if their anticipated profits would not be compromised. And
from the consumer's perspective, a virtual picture would also
shield him from prosecution.40  Thus, there is good reason to
believe that legalizing virtual child pornography may reduce the
39. Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110
Stat. 3009-26, 3009-28 (1996) (defining child pornography as "any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct").
40. The only reason that this might not happen is the dollar cost of
producing virtual child pornography. This, of course, is a reason for the law to
keep the cost of exploiting real children high. It is also a reason to decriminalize
virtual pornography as the Supreme Court has done.
20031
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number of children that are currently exploited by this perverted
industry. And so, the United States Supreme Court may well have
rendered a decision that will ultimately protect children as well as
protecting freedom of speech.
